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The safety assessment of Nuclear Power Plants makes use of Thermal-Hydraulic codes for the 
quantification of the safety margins with respect to upper/lower safety thresholds, when postulated 
accidental scenarios occur. To explicitly treat uncertainties in the safety margins estimates within the 
Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) framework, we resort to the concept of 
Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Margin (DPSM). We propose to add to the framework a sensitivity 
analysis that calculates how much the Thermal-Hydraulic (TH) code inputs affect the DPSM, in 
support to the selection of the most proper probabilistic safety assessment method to be used for the 
problem at hand, between static or dynamic methods (e.g., Event Trees (ETs) or Dynamic ETs 
(DETs), respectively). Two case studies are considered: firstly a Station Black Out followed by a Seal 
Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) for a 3-loops Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), whose dynamics 
is simulated by a MAAP5 model and, secondly, the accidental scenarios that can occur in a U-Tube 
Steam Generator, whose dynamics is simulated by a SIMULINK model. The results show that the 
sensitivity analysis performed on the DPSM points out that an ET-based analysis is sufficient in one 
case, whereas a DET-based analysis is needed for the other case. 
KEYWORDS: Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Margin, Risk-Informed Safety Margin 
Characterization, Integrated Deterministic Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Dynamic Event Tree, 




LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AC Alternate Current 
AFW Auxiliary Feed Water 
BDBA Beyond Design Basis Accident 
BE Best Estimate 
DBA Design Basis Accident 
DET Dynamic Event Tree 
DOE Department Of Energy 
DPSM Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Margin 
ET Event Tree 
FT Fault Tree 
IDPSA Integrated Deterministic Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident 
LWRS Light Water Reactor Sustainability 
MAAP5 Modular Accident Analysis Program version 5 
MCS Minimal Cut Set 
MVL Multiple Value Logic 
NM Near Miss 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
OS Order statistics 
PI Prime Implicant 
PID Proportional Integrative Derivative 
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor 
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump 
RCS Reactor Coolant System 
RISMC Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization 
RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel 
SA Safety Assessment 
SBO Station Black Out 
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SG Steam Generator 
TH Thermal-Hydraulic 
UTSG U-Tube Steam Generator 
 
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
𝑎 Accidental scenario 
M(𝑦𝑗, 𝑎) Safety margin for the j - th safety parameter during the accidental scenario 𝑎 
𝑦𝑗 j - th safety parameter 
𝑗 Index of the safety parameter, j = 1, 2, …, J 
𝐽 Number of safety parameters 
𝑦𝑗(𝑎) j - th safety parameter for the accidental scenario 𝑎 
𝑦𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑓 Nominal value of the safety parameter 𝑦𝑗 during normal operation 
𝑈𝑗 Upper threshold for the j - th safety parameter 
𝐿𝑗 Lower threshold for the j - th safety parameter 
𝑦𝛾1 Real value of the 𝛾1
𝑡ℎ percentile of the safety parameter 
𝑦𝑡 (Grace) time required to reach 𝑦𝑗 
𝛾1 Probability that y is lower than 𝑦𝛾1 
𝑦𝑡𝛾2
 Real value of the 𝛾2
𝑡ℎ percentile of the time yt 
𝛾2 Probability that 𝑦𝑡 is lower than 𝑦𝑡𝛾2
 
?̂?𝛾1 Estimate of 𝑦𝛾1 
?̂?𝑡𝛾2  Estimate of 𝑦𝑡𝛾2
 
𝛽 Confidence value in the percentile estimation 
𝛽1 Confidence in the estimation of 𝑦𝛾1 
𝛽2 Confidence in the estimation of 𝑦𝑡𝛾2
 
𝑀(𝛾1, 𝛽1) 
Probabilistic Safety Margin estimated by the 𝛾1
𝑡ℎ percentile of y with 
confidence 𝛽1 
𝑀(𝛾1, 𝛽1, 𝛾2, 𝛽2) 
Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Margin estimated by the 𝛾1
𝑡ℎ percentile of y 
with confidence 𝛽1 and the 𝛾2
𝑡ℎ percentile of yt with confidence 𝛽2 
?̅? Vector of a generic model inputs 
𝑥 Model input  
𝑥𝑘 k – th model input, k = 1, 2, … 
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𝑘 Index of the model input 
𝑥𝑘,𝑖 i – th value of the k – th model input  
?̅? Vector of the calculated safety parameter realizations 
𝑦𝑛 Safety parameter that is calculated during n-th calculation, n = 1,2,…N 
𝑛 Index of the simulations 
?̅?𝑡 Output vector of the calculated times at which the values ?̅? are reached 
𝑦𝑡𝑛 Time at which 𝑦𝑛 is reached 
𝑁 Number of simulations 
?̃?𝑘,𝑖 Normalized input value of 𝑥𝑘,𝑖 
∆𝑦𝑡 Maximum variability range of the normalized output 
∆𝑥𝑘 Maximum variability range of the k – th input 
?̃?𝑡|𝑥𝑘 = 𝑥𝑘,𝑖 Normalized value of 𝑦𝑡computed for the subgroup with 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑥𝑘,𝑖 kept fixed 
𝐼𝑥𝑘 Sensitivity Index for the k – th input 
𝑃𝐶𝐷 Core Damage Probability 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑐 Recovery time 
P (𝑥𝑘 = 𝑥𝑘,𝑖) Probability that 𝑥𝑘 assumes the value 𝑥𝑘,𝑖 
𝑄𝑒 Feedwater in the UTSG 
𝑃𝑂 Operating Power in the UTSG 
𝑃𝑛 Nominal Power in the UTSG 
𝑄𝑣 Exiting steam in the UTSG 
𝑊𝑟𝑙 Wide Range Level in the UTSG 
𝑁𝑟𝑙 Narrow Range Level in the UTSG 
𝑃𝐹 UTSG probability of failure  
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The Safety Assessment (SA) of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is based on the evaluation of the 
consequences of a number of postulated accidental scenarios and on the quantification of their 
probabilities of occurrence. This is done to verify that the plant design satisifies prescribed safety 
margins, i.e., that there is sufficient difference between the values reached by the pre-defined safety 
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parameters during the accidental scenarios and the pre-set thresholds that must not be exceeded in 
order not to endanger the NPP operability and safety.  
Best Estimate (BE) Thermal-Hydraulic (TH) codes are used to simulate the dynamics of the safety 
parameters during the postulated accidental scenarios. Traditional (static) Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (PSA) methods, such as Fault Trees (FTs) and Event Trees (ETs), are used to compute 
the probability of occurrence of the accidental scenarios.  
Recently, Integrated Deterministic Probabilistic Safety Assessment (IDPSA) has been proposed as a 
way for explicitly embedding the deterministic TH analysis within the probabilistic analysis, by 
systematically treating both aleatory (stochastic) and epistemic (modelling) uncertainties in the 
accidental progression [Zio, 2014; Aldemir 2013]. 
IDPSA methods include Discrete Dynamic Event Tree [Karanki et al., 2011], Continuous Dynamic 
Event Tree [Smidts, 1994], Dynamic Event Tree [Metzroth et al., 2011; Karanki et al., 2015], Monte 
Carlo Dynamic Event Tree [Hofer et al., 2002; Hofer et al., 2004], DYnamic Logical Analytical 
Methodology [Cojazzi,1996]. These methods are conceived to dynamically analyze the evolution of 
accidental scenarios and model the operational risk in complex dynamic systems, explicity  
accounting for mutual interactions between failures of software and hardware components and their 
recovery, control and operator actions [Zio, 2014; Aldemir 2013].   
Even though the safety margins quantification required by risk assessment within the Risk Informed 
Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) initiated by the US Department Of Energy (DOE) within 
the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program [US DOE, 2009], is expected to be able to 
effectively catch the system dynamics and the uncertain TH codes assumptions and parameters, this 
work is the first effective attempt to achieve this goal.  
We resort to the quantification of the Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Margin (DPSM), where Order 
Statistics (OS) is used to compute, with a given confidence, the estimate of a given percentile of the 
distribution of the safety parameter and a given percentile of the time required for the safety parameter 
to reach the considered parameter percentile value [Di Maio et al., 2016]. This allows giving due 
account to the dynamics of the system undergoing an accidental scenario.  
The DPSM is, then, originally exploited within a novel sensitivity analysis approach to identify which 
input parameter affects most the safety margin and, in particular, how much dynamic inputs influence 
the safety margin. This helps understanding whether a dynamic probabilistic safety method (e.g., a 
Dynamic ET (DET)) or whether a static probabilistic method (e.g., a static ET) is needed for the NPP 
safety assessment. Indeed, the dynamic approach gives a more detailed description of the process, but 
at the expense of a large computational burden. In this respect, it would make no sense to waste 
resources on a dynamic analysis of a system when conventional static methods can provide adequate 
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results. As a matter of fact, the main goal of this paper is just to provide a framework for choosing 
which approach (whether static or dynamic) better fit to the system under analysis.  
In ordert to show how the framework works, two case studies are considered. In the first case, a 
Station Black Out (SBO) accident followed by a Seal Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) has been 
modelled and simulated with MAAP5 TH code [MAAP5]. Dynamic aspects such as time lag between 
SBO and LOCA and promptness of operators actions have been simulated. The DPSMs 
corresponding to the event of core uncovery have been computed and a sensitivity analysis has been 
performed on these time-dependent results. As we shall see, the results show that the dynamic aspects 
considered in TH simulations do not affect the calculated DPSMs and, thus, we conclude that the 
static probabilistic models are sufficient for the analysis and, therefore, no dynamic probabilistic 
models are developed for the Seal LOCA accident.  
The second case study regards a U-Tube Steam Generator (UTSG), modelled with SIMULINK. In 
the dynamic model, four components (i.e., the outlet steam valve, the safety valve, the Proportional 
Integral Derivative (PID) controller and the communication between the sensor and the PID) can fail 
during the accident progression. Dynamic aspects such as the magnitude, the order and timing of the 
possible failure events have been included in the simulations. The DPSMs have been computed and 
the sensitivity analysis has been performed, showing the importance of including the dynamic aspects 
in the probabilistic model. Consequently, for the considered UTSG, a DET analysis is necessary for 
proper assessment and quantification of the probabilities of occurrence of the accidental scenarios 
and of the DPSMs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the definition of the DPSM is given and 
the sensitivity analysis approach is described. In Section 3, the two case studies are presented and 
worked out. In section 4, some conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. THE DPSM AND THE DPSM-BASED SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
2.1 The DPSM  
The safety margin is traditionally defined as the minimum distance between the system “loading” and 
its “capacity” [DOE, 2009]. Mathematically, considering a specific accidental scenario a and a safety 
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where 𝑦𝑗,𝑟𝑒𝑓 is the nominal value of the safety parameter 𝑦𝑗 during normal operation. 
The safety margins are, traditionally, computed by TH codes for a set of postulated scenarios, called 
Design Basis Accidents (DBAs). Conservatism in assumptions and parameters values is adopted in 
order to take into account uncertainties in models and parameters [Commission’s White Paper, 
February 1999; IAEA, 2009]. 
Recently, safety margins are being evaluated also for Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBAs), thus, 
considering a larger set of scenarios. Moreover, Best Estimate (BE) TH codes are employed to 
evaluate the safety parameters with less conservatism and more realistic assumptions [Zio et al., 2010; 
Alvarenga et al., 2015]. To account and propagate all the aleatory and epistemic uncertainties [US 
D.O.E., 2009] affecting the BE TH codes, a Dynamic Probabilistic Safety Margin (DPSM) has been 
proposed in [Di Maio et al., 2016]. The DPSM extends the definitions of safety margin in Eq. (1) and 
Eq. (2), by replacing 𝑦𝑗  with 𝑦𝛾1, and also by considering in the safety margin quantification 𝑦𝑡𝛾2
. In 
particular, 𝑦𝛾1 is the γ1
th percentile of the distribution of the safety parameter 𝑦𝑗 (usually the 95
th, 
according to regulatory guidance), whereas 𝑦𝑡𝛾2
is the γ2th percentile (usually the 5th) of the distribution 
of the earliest (grace) time 𝑦𝑡 required to reach 𝑦𝛾1 (i.e., the available time for recovering from the 
occurrence of accidental scenario a).  
Order Statistics (OS) is a non parametric approach that can be used for the estimation of  𝑦𝛾1 and 𝑦𝑡𝛾2
, 
as it allows evaluating the values of the required percentiles with confidences β1 and β2, respectively, 
as explained in Appendix A, on the basis of a limited set of BE TH dynamic simulations of the system 
evolution.  
In this work, two different approaches will be used for the computation of the estimates of 𝑦 and 𝑦𝑡, 
namely the Bracketing and the Coverage approaches (see Appendix A). The former assumes the 
outputs 𝑦 and 𝑦𝑡 to be uncorrelated. Their corresponding percentile estimates (?̂?𝛾1 and ?̂?𝑡𝛾2 , 
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respectively) are, therefore, computed separately and independently ranked. On the other hand, since 
the coverage approach assumes correlation between the outputs, and, consequently, 𝑦 is sorted 
corresponding to 𝑦𝑡 , and they are required to simultaneously lie in the estimated percentile 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 
[Di Maio et al., 2016]. 
We can, thus, define a DPSM with respect to an upper threshold 𝑈𝑗 as in [Di Maio et al., 2016]: 
 








, 𝑖𝑓 ?̂?𝛾1 ≤ 𝑈𝑗
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑗 < ?̂?𝛾1





with grace time ?̂?𝑡𝛾2  (3) 
where 
𝛾1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑦 < 𝑦𝛾1} (4) 
𝛽1 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑦𝛾1 < ?̂?𝛾1} (5) 
and  
𝛾2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝑦𝑡 < 𝑦𝑡𝛾2} (6) 
𝛽2 = 𝑃𝑟 {𝑦𝑡𝛾2 > ?̂?𝑡𝛾2} (7) 
 
where ?̂?𝛾 is the estimate of the γ
th percentile. 
As we shall see in what follows, it is worth mentioning that in those cases in which the number 𝑁 of 
BE TH available simulations is low, the analyst should decide whether it is better to fix β or γ for 
providing the proper estimate of the DPSM that, in principle, should be given with 𝛾1 = 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 
0.95 and 𝛾2 = 0.05, as prescribed by regulation guidances [IAEA, 2009].  
 
2.2 Sensitivity Analysis on the DPSM 
Sensitivity analysis can help finding insights on the behaviour of a model, on its structure and on the 
way it responds to changes in the model input [Borgonovo et al., 2015; Zio, 2009; Saltelli et al., 
2000]. It also allows ranking the model parameters according to the different contributions they give 
to the variability of the output [Di Maio et al., 2015a].  
In this work, the model output of interest is the DPSM as defined in Section 2.1 and the aim is to 
determine whether the inputs of a dynamic simulation code influence (or not) the DPSM 
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quantification. A sensitivity index must be defined and, based on this, one can decide the appropriate 
probabilistic approach (static/dynamic) for the quantification of the probabilities of occurrence of the 
accidental scenarios to be analysed.  
Sensitivity indexes can be classified into local and global [Zio, 2009; Saltelli et al., 2000]. However, 
since local sensitivity indexes provide information that is only valid locally, for the purpose of our 
work a global index seems to be more suitable. Global sensitivity indexes, indeed, aim to measuring 
the contribution of an input to the variability of the output over the entire range of both the input and 
the output, also accounting for the input interaction through dependences [Di Maio et al., 2015a; Zio, 
2009; Saltelli et al., 2000]. Among popular global indexes are the Pearson and the Sobol indexes 
[Sobol, 1993], the latter being an extension of the Variance Decomposition method [Sobol, 1993; 
McKay, 1996; Borgonovo et al., 2014; Iooss et  Lemaître, 2015]. However, Pearson and Sobol 
indexes are limited by the assumptions on the linearity and monotonicity of the model (Pearson) and 
by demanding computational costs (Sobol).  
We therefore define a novel sensitivity index 𝐼𝑥 (where x is a generic model input) that, even if 
approximate, is simple to calculate and does not require any hypothesis on the model. Without loss 
of generality, let assume that ?̅? = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3} where 𝑥1, 𝑥2 and 𝑥3 are three input variables, with 
instances ?̅?1 = {𝑥1,1, 𝑥1,2, 𝑥1,3}, ?̅?2 = {𝑥2,1, 𝑥2,2} and ?̅?3 = {𝑥3,1, 𝑥3,2, 𝑥3,3, 𝑥3,4}. We also assume that 
one simulation is available for each combination of these values. Consequently a total of 𝑁 = 24 
different simulations is available resulting in vectors of 𝑁 possible values of y and 𝑦𝑡, ?̅? =
 {𝑦1, 𝑦2,… , 𝑦𝑁}, and 𝑦?̅? = {𝑦𝑡1 , 𝑦𝑡2 , … , 𝑦𝑡𝑁}, respectively. By resorting to OS (see Appendix A), the 
DPSM for each input parameter and the corresponding time can be computed, as shown in Section 
2.1, by using all the available simulations (that would account for the input variable interdependences) 
but also by considering the partitioning of the 𝑁 available simulations in subgroups (that would 
account for the contribution of single inputs, independently). In other words, considering each input 
parameter separately, a DPSM is computed for each fixed value that the parameter can assume and 
using only the simulations in which the variable assumes the considered value. Thus, for example, 
when referring to 𝑥1, we compute the DPSM considering only results of 𝑦𝑡 collected for the subgroups 
of simulations done with 𝑥1 = 𝑥1,1, 𝑥1 = 𝑥1,2 and 𝑥1 = 𝑥1,3, (i.e., 𝑦𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,1, 𝑦𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,2 and 
𝑦𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,3, respectively). 
For the computation of the sensitivity index, both the input (e.g., 𝑥1) and the output (e.g., 𝑦𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,𝑖 
with i = 1,2,3 when 𝑥 = 𝑥1) are first normalized with respect to their maxima: 
?̃?1,𝑖 = 
𝑥1,𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑥1,1; 𝑥1,2; 𝑥1,3)
, with i = 1,2,3 (8) 
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?̃?𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,1 =
𝑦𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,1
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑦𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,1;  𝑦𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,2;  𝑦𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,3)
 (9) 







where ∆y𝑡 is the range of variability of the normalized output, i.e, the difference between the 
maximum normalized output 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (?̃?𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,1;  ?̃?𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,2; ?̃?𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,3), that is equal to 1 
(according to the normalization), and the minimum normalized output 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (?̃?𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,1;  ?̃?𝑡|𝑥1 =
𝑥1,2; ?̃?𝑡|𝑥1 = 𝑥1,3); similarly, ∆𝑥1 is the range of variability of the normalized input 𝑥1. Also, 𝐼𝑥 can 
be computed for the other input variables 𝑥2 and 𝑥3.  
Notice that the index 𝐼𝑥 is not constrained by any linearity and/or monotonic assumption on the 
input/output relationship (opposed to Pearson coefficient) with limited computational costs (opposed 
to Sobol indexes), and gives an indication on the variability of the output depending on the variability 
of the input: the larger 𝐼𝑥, the more the considered input x influences the output 𝑦𝑡.  
As we shall see, the proposed strategy for deciding which probabilistic method should be used for the 
analysis is based on the ranking provided by Ix: when a dynamic input is ranked below others that are 
not time-dependent, a static probabilistic analysis of accident progression by ET is sufficient to 
compute the probabilities of occurrence of the considered accidental scenarios; when a dynamic input 
is among the top ranked, a dynamic probabilistic analysis, e.g., with a DET, is needed. 
 
3. THE CASE STUDIES  
In this Section, we present two applications of the proposed method for the selection of the 
probabilistic model to be used in a safety assessment. In the first case study, a Station BlackOut 
accident followed by a Seal Loss Of Coolant Accident is considered. The outcomes of the sensitivity 
analysis will suggest that a static probabilistic model for representing the accident progression to be 
enough for the purpose of the safety analysis. For this, ETs are built. In the second case study, a U-
Tube Stam Generator is considered in which some components fail at different times and magnitudes. 
In this case, the calculated sensitivity indexes are larger for the dynamic inputs and, consequently, a 
framework for the DET is developed for the purpose of performing a safety analysis. 
 
3.1 SBO Seal LOCA 
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3.1.1 The accidental scenario 
The accidental scenario considered is a station blackout accident followed by a Seal LOCA in a 3-
loops Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). During a SBO, a Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) is 
worsened by the failure of all the emergency diesel engines. Under these circumstances, the reactor 
trip is activated and the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) are shut off.  
 
 
Figure 1: Typical design of a Reactor Coolant Pump [RCP] 
 
In this sequence of events, we focus on the behaviour of the Reactor Coolant Pumps (shown in Figure 
1), and in particular on its seal package. The RCPs are installed on the cold leg of each loop of the 
NPP between the Steam Generators (SGs) and the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). They contain a 
seals package consisting in three different seals (i.e., seal stages), each made up by a primary and a 
secondary seal. These seals must continuously be cooled in normal operation as well as during the 
SBO [NUREG/CR-4948]. During normal operation, a seal injection system (that consists in a seal 
water inlet and a cooling water outlet) and a thermal barrier heat exchanger are the systems devoted 
to cool the seals. However, when a SBO occurs, seals cooling systems are lost and the seals overheat. 
Consequently, a Seal LOCA occurs at different leakage rates, that depend on the seal that fails. We 
consider leakage rates equal to 76, 182 and 480 gpm/RCP [WOG2000], corresponding to the failure 
of the first seal alone, both the second and third seals and all the three seals, respectively. Seals failure 
can occur according to three possible failure modes [WOG2000]: popping-open (i.e., opening of the 
seal faces due to hydraulic instability caused by fluid flashing), binding (i.e., binding failure of the 
seal ring against the housing inserts due to secondary seal extrusion), O-ring extrusion (i.e., 




3.1.2 Dynamic MAAP5 Simulations 
The Seal LOCAs scenarios have been simulated for all the considered leakage rates with a BE TH 
MAAP5 code [MAAP5], whose nodalization scheme is shown in Figure 2. This code reproduces, 
when fed with the set of initiating events and operators actions listed in Table 1, the responses of the 
reactor to the postulated accidental scenario. Although the code is able to provide the simulation 
results also beyond core damage, the analysis will focus on the core uncover. Then, the values of the 
safety parameter 𝑦𝑗, the threshold L and the value of 𝑦𝑡 required to evaluate the DPSM can be 
retrieved from the simulations. In fact, we can simulate the evolution in time of the boiled-up water 
level of the primary coolant 𝑦𝑗 (with j = 1, since this the only safety parameter considered) and the 
core uncovery time 𝑦𝑡. In MAAP5 the core uncover corresponds to the condition when the boiled-up 
water level falls below the top of active fuel 𝐿 = 6.6 m. The corresponding core uncover time is 
therefore a result provided by the code. It is worth mentioning that, during normal operation, the 
reference level is equal to yref = 7 m.  
 
Figure 2: Water nodalization for 3-Loops PWR [MAAP5]  
 
The scenario modelled is the following. The simulation starts with the SBO occurrence. All the seals 
cooling systems are, therefore, assumed to be lost, leading to the seals overheating. Seals can fail (due 
to popping-open) at different times (𝑥1) from the onset of the SBO: immediately (𝑥1,1 = 0 min), after 
13 min (𝑥1,2 = 13 min) or after 30 min (𝑥1,3 = 30 min). With the seal failure, the leakage rate increases 
from 21 gpm/RCP to a value that depends on the number of seals that have failed (𝑥2,1 = 76, 𝑥2,2 = 
182 and 𝑥2,3 = 480 
𝑔𝑝𝑚
𝑅𝐶𝑃
). Operators are, thus, called to undertake counteracting measures to mitigate 
the possible consequences of this accident. They, first, activate a secondary cooling by opening a 
relief valve at different times (𝑥3,1 = 20, 𝑥3,2 = 30, 𝑥3,3 = 40, 𝑥3,4 = 50, 𝑥3,5 = 60 min from the 
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seal failure) and, then, regulate the Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) system (by decreasing the target of 
the SG level) by following either strategy “A” (𝑥4,1 = "𝐴"), that is the AFW regulation occurs at the 
same time of the relief valve opening, or strategy “B” (𝑥4,2 = "𝐵"), that is the regulation of AFW 
occurs 3 h later than the leakage rate increase. Moreover, when the primary pressure falls below 4 
MPa, the accumulators automatically inject water in the cold leg of each loop. The values of the input 
variables for the dynamic simulations are shown in Table 1.  
 
𝒙𝟏[𝒎𝒊𝒏] 




















A: t (AFW operation) = t (relief valve opening) 
B: t (AFW operation) = 3 h after the leakege rate increase 
Table 1: MAAP5 simulation inputs 
Assuming 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 and 𝑥4 to be independent and described by discrete uniform distributions in the 
ranges of the simulation inputs of Table 1 (i.e., joint distributions are neglected), all the possible 
combinations of these inputs leads to 𝑁 = 90 alternative dynamic simulations for the case under 
analysis. 
 
3.1.3 The DPSM-based Sensitivity Analysis results 
 3.1.3.1 The DPSMs 
The collected values of ?̅? and ?̅?𝑡 (i.e., the boiled-up water level and the uncovery time, respectively) 
have been employed for the calculation of the DPSM. Since the core uncovery occurs when the 
boiled-up water level falls below the top of the active fuel length 𝐿, we assume the safety margins to 
be calculated with respect to 𝐿 as lower threshold. Resorting to OS and using all the N = 90 available 
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simulations as well as all the possible subgroups of simulation (that is, considering the simulations 
when each input variable is kept fixed), we have estimated the values of the 𝛾1
𝑡ℎ and 𝛾2
𝑡ℎ percentiles 
of the boiled-up water level and of the time at which such level is reached, with confidences 𝛽1 and 
𝛽2, respectively.  
The DPSMs with “Bracketing” and “Coverage” approaches, 𝑁 = 90 (i.e., all the possible values of 
x1, x2, x3 and x4 have been considered simultaneously) and 𝛾2 = 0.05 are shown in Table 2, whereas 
in Table 3 the DPSMs with N = 90 and 𝛽2 = 0.95 are shown, again, for the both approaches.  
It is worth mentioning that, even though the regulatory guidances prescribe the DPSM to be given 
with 𝛾1 = 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 0.95 and 𝛾2 = 0.05, the limited number N of available simulations: 
- limits the analysis on the estimation of the grace time available before core uncovering with 
the desired 𝛾2 and 𝛽2; 
- is not large enough to allow for an estimate of ?̂?𝑡 with 𝛾2 = 0.05 and 𝛽2= 0.95. 
Therefore, in Table 2, we provide the result of the 𝛾2
𝑡ℎ percentile of yt, with as large as possible 𝛽2, 
according to the two different approaches of “Bracketing” and “Coverage”, as explained in Appendix 
A. Instead, in Table 3, we provide the results when the confidence in the estimation, i.e., 𝛽2, is fixed 
to at least equal to 0.95 whereas the value of the estimated percentile 𝛾2 varies according to theory 
(Appendix A).  
In general terms, all these simulations of 𝑦 are “up to core uncovery”, i.e., 𝑦 reaches the lower 
threshold 𝐿 in all the available simulations and, thus, the margin is estimated to be equal to 0. The 
DPSM of Eq. (3), however, provides the analyst with the additional information the grace time ?̂?𝑡 
(before the core uncovery), which is a main benefit of the DPSM with respect to a traditional safety 
margin. When the ?̂?𝛾1 is equal to L, the value of the grace time ?̂?𝑡 is the time available for taking 
counteracting/mitigation actions before core uncover. 
 
𝜸𝟐 𝜷𝟐 “Bracketing” 𝜷𝟐 “Coverage” ?̂?𝜸𝟏[𝒎] ?̂?𝒕 [s] DPSM 
0.05 0.98 0.94 6.6 = L 7406 
0 within a grace time of 
7406 s 
Table 2: DPSM (N=90 and with fixed 𝛾2) for the Seal LOCA 
 
𝜷𝟐 𝜸𝟐  “Bracketing” 𝜸𝟐  “Coverage” ?̂?𝜸𝟏[𝒎] ?̂?𝒕 [s] DPSM 
0.95 0.04 0.03 6.6 = L 7406 
0 within a grace time of 
7406 s 




Results of the computation of the DPSM for the case of subgroups are shown hereafter. It is worth 
mentioning that: (i) being only “up to core uncover” transients available for the DPSM quantification; 
(ii) being the ?̂?𝛾1 equal to L (as shown before in Tables 2-3); (iii) being the number 𝑁 of available 
simulations lower than 90 for each considered subgroup, we focus only on the estimation of the value 
?̂?𝑡 that, incidentally, as already said, cannot be estimated with both 𝛽2 and 𝛾2 values, as required by 
regulatory guidances (as shown in Tables 2-3). We first present in Table 4 the results when 𝛾2 = 0.05, 
even though with a reduced confidence 𝛽2 in its estimation. As we can see, for each case considered, 
we rely on a different number 𝑁 of available simulations. This is due to the fact that when we consider 
a variable fixed at a given value, the number of simulations reduces to only those that have as inputs 
the selected fixed value of that input variable and the combination of all the other possible values of 
the other input variables. We show that: 
 the “Bracketing” approach generally provides a larger confidence 𝛽2 for the estimation of the 
𝛾2
𝑡ℎ percentile of 𝑦𝑡 than the “Coverage” approach; 
 when we consider results obtained with fixed values of the inputs, the confidence 𝛽2 generally 
unfavourably increases, being the number 𝑁 of available simulations lower than when all 
possible values of 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 and 𝑥4 are simultaneously considered; the values of 𝛽2, indeed,  
go from 0.98 and 0.94 (“Bracketing” and “Coverage”, respectively), to 0.36 and 0.24 (when 
𝑥3 is kept fixed and 𝑁 = 18); 
 the worst case (i.e., the shortest grace time available for counteracting the developing accident 
?̂?𝑡 = 7406 s) corresponds to the scenario in which a leakage rate 𝑥2 = 480 gpm/RCP occurs 
at the beginning of the scenario (𝑥1 = 0 s) and operators act after twenty minutes (𝑥3 = 20 








𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥4 
are considered 
simultaneously 
90 0.05 0.98 0.94 7406 
𝒙𝟏[𝒎𝒊𝒏] 
is kept fixed 
0 30 0.05 0.62 0.45 7406 
13 30 0.05 0.62 0.45 8516 
30 30 0.05 0.62 0.45 9555 
𝒙𝟐 
[gpm/RCP] 
is kept fixed 
76 30 0.05 0.62 0.45 30713 
182 30 0.05 0.62 0.45 15118 
480 30 0.05 0.62 0.45 7406 
𝒙𝟑[min] 
is kept fixed 
20 18 0.05 0.36 0.24 7406 
30 18 0.05 0.36 0.24 8298 
40 18 0.05 0.36 0.24 7608 
50 18 0.05 0.36 0.24 7544 
60 18 0.05 0.36 0.24 7599 
𝒙𝟒 
is kept fixed 
A 45 0.05 0.81 0.67 7406 
B 45 0.05 0.81 0.67 7544 
Table 4: DPSM results for Seal LOCA simulations (fixed N and γ) 
 
In a similar way, Table 5 presents the results of estimating the value of γ2  with β2 = 0.95, and both 
“Bracketing” and “Coverage” approaches. The goal is to provide the 𝛾2 estimates with the desired 
confidence, even though it cannot be the 95th. We show that: 
 when 𝛽2 is fixed, the “Bracketing” approach provides an unfavorable estimate of the 𝛾2
𝑡ℎ 
percentile with fixed 𝛽2 with respect to the “Coverage” approach.; 
 when we consider results obtained with fixed values of the inputs, the value of the percentile 
that can be estimated unfavorably increases, being the number 𝑁 of available simulations 
lower than when all possible values of 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 and 𝑥4 are simultaneously considered; the 
values of 𝛾2, indeed,  go from 0.04 and 0.03 (“Bracketing” and “Coverage”, respectively), to 
0.19 and 0.16 (when 𝑥3 is kept fixed and 𝑁 = 18).  
 the worst case (i.e., the shortest grace time available for counteracting the developing accident 
?̂?𝑡 = 7406 s) corresponds to the scenario in which a leakage rate 𝑥2 = 480 gpm/RCP occurs 
at the beginning of the scenario (𝑥1 = 0 s) and operators act after twenty minutes (𝑥3 = 20 in) 









𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥4 
are considered 
simultaneously 
90 0.95 0.04 0.03 7406 
𝒙𝟏[𝒎𝒊𝒏] 
is kept fixed 
0 30 0.95 0.12 0.1 7406 
13 30 0.95 0.12 0.1 8516 
30 30 0.95 0.12 0.1 9555 
𝒙𝟐 
[gpm/RCP] 
is kept fixed 
76 30 0.95 0.12 0.1 30713 
182 30 0.95 0.12 0.1 15118 
480 30 0.95 0.12 0.1 7406 
𝒙𝟑[min] 
is kept fixed 
20 18 0.95 0.19 0.16 7406 
30 18 0.95 0.19 0.16 8298 
40 18 0.95 0.19 0.16 7608 
50 18 0.95 0.19 0.16 7544 
60 18 0.95 0.19 0.16 7599 
𝒙𝟒 
is kept fixed 
A 45 0.95 0.08 0.07 7406 
B 45 0.95 0.08 0.07 7544 
Table 5: DPSM results for Seal LOCA simulations (fixed N and β) 
 
 
 3.1.3.2 Sensitivity analysis 
On the basis of the results shown in Tables 4 and 5, the proposed sensitivity index of Eq. (10) has 
been computed for each input variable 𝑥𝑘, k = 1, 2, 3, 4 (see Section 2.2). Results are shown in Table 
6, where in column 2 the possible values 𝑥𝑘,𝑖 of 𝑥𝑘 are listed, in column 3 the estimated values of the 
grace time ?̂?𝑡 are listed, in columns 4 and 5 the variability range of the normalized input ∆𝑥𝑘 (as 
explained in Section 2.2) and the variability range ∆?̂?𝑡 of the normalized ?̂?𝑡, are listed respectively, 
for the simulations where each input variable is kept fixed. Finally, in the last column, the value of 




𝒙𝒌 𝒙𝒌,𝒊 ?̂?𝒕 ∆𝒙𝒌 ∆?̂?𝒕 𝑰𝒙𝒌 
𝒙𝟏[𝒎𝒊𝒏] 
0 7406 















0.89 0.02 0.02 
B 7544 
 
Table 6: Results of the sensitivity analysis for the Seal LOCA case study 
 
Based on the results of the sensitivity index Ix shown in Table 6, we can conclude that 𝑥2  (the leakage 
rate) is the input variable that most affects the grace time, followed by 𝑥1 (time of the leakage rate 
increase after the SBO). On the other hand, 𝑥3 (the time of the activation of the secondary cooling by 
operators) and 𝑥4 (the strategy they adopt for this) have little influence on the grace time and, thus, 
on the safety margin. 
Since the dynamic variables 𝑥3 and 𝑥4 are not the most influencing the output, a static probabilistic 
safety assessment is considered sufficient for the analysis of a Seal LOCA following an SBO accident 
in a 3-loops PWR. The related following probabilistic analysis will focus only on the role of the 
leakage rate, and, eventually, of the time of the leakage rate increase. For this, we will resort to the 
models proposed by the Westinghouse Owners Group and named the WOG2000 and the WOG2000 
(revised), the model revised by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to build the static 
ETs for the computation of the probabilities of occurrence of the accident scenarios considered. 
 
3.1.4 The Seal LOCA ETs models 
For the safety assessment of the Seal LOCA accidental scenario considered, we calculate its 
probability of occurrence with static ETs, defined as WOG2000 and WOG2000 (revised) 
[WOG2000] that essentially differ in: 
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 the assumption on the time of the leakage rate increase after the SBO (30 min for the 
WOG2000, 0 and 13 min for the WOG2000 (revised)); 
 the value of the popping-open/binding failure probability of the third seal stage (this is 
explicitly accounted for the WOG2000, whereas it is not for the WOG2000 (revised) that 
assumes the failure can occur only when the second seal stage fails); 
 the assumption on the seal failure probability due to O-ring extrusion (a value of 0.5 is 
assigned to the probability of occurrence of this failure mode in the WOG2000 (revised), 
whereas it is set equal to zero in the WOG2000, since this latter assumes the Reactor Coolant 
System (RCS) pressure is kept lower than 118 bar within two hours, avoiding O-ring 
extrusion). 
These models define the first, second and third failure probabilities, for each seal failure mode (i.e., 
popping-open, binding, O-ring extrusion). However, a single probability is defined for the popping-
open and binding failure mode as for the high-temperature O-ring failure mode (to which both the 
probabilistic models refer), and the binding failure mode is negligible. Each ET branch is 
characterized by a leakage rate probability that depends on the number of failed seals and by the 





(𝒙𝟏= 30 min) 
WOG2000 (revised) 
(𝒙𝟏= 13 min,  




1st Seal Stage 0.0125 0.0125 
2nd Seal Stage 0.2 0.2 
3rd Seal Stage 0.27 
1  
(only if the second 
seal stage fails) 
O-ring extrusion 0 0.5 
 
Table 7: Probabilities of the branches of the RCP Seal LOCA ET models  
 
Figure 3 shows the static ET for the WOG2000 model, whereas Figure 4 the static ET for the 
WOG2000 (revised). Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the branches that arise from an initiating event of 
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SBO (with the consequent loss of the seal cooling), evolving according to the failure of the different 
seals. In the ETs, we can notice that O-ring extrusion is not considered for any of the models, since it 
has been demonstrated that the condition provided by the WOG2000 (revised) (depressurization 
resulting in a RCS pressure lower than 118 bar within two hours) leads to a probability of failure 
equal to zero.  
 
Figure 3: WOG2000 static ET [WOG2000] 
 
 
Figure 4: WOG2000 (revised) static ET [WOG2000] 
 
The different number of possible sequences is due to the fact that the WOG2000 model considers five 
possible leakage rates (21, 57, 76, 182, 480 gpm/RCP), whereas four leakages (21, 76, 182, 480 
gpm/RCP)  are considered for the WOG2000 (revised) model because in this latter model, as already 























The static ETs can be used for the quantification of the different probabilistic models for the Seal 
LOCA. For this purpose, a probability has been assigned arbitrarily to each discrete possible value of 
the input variables of the dynamic simulations (in particular, for 𝑥3 and 𝑥4). Referring for example to 
𝑥3, we have arbitrarily assigned a value to the probability that 𝑥3 assumes the value 𝑥3,1 (i.e., P(𝑥3 =
𝑥3,1)), 𝑥3,2 (i.e., P(𝑥3 = 𝑥3,2)), 𝑥3,3 (i.e., P(𝑥3 = 𝑥3,3)), 𝑥3,4 (i.e., P(𝑥3 = 𝑥3,4)) and 𝑥3,5 (i.e., P(𝑥3 =
𝑥3,5)), where P(𝑥3 = 𝑥3,1) + P(𝑥3 = 𝑥3,2) + P(𝑥3 = 𝑥3,3) + P(𝑥3 = 𝑥3,4) + P(𝑥3 = 𝑥3,5) = 1. 
Analogously, we have assumed P(𝑥4 = "𝐴"), P(𝑥4 = "𝐵"). Whereas, for 𝑥2, probabilities that 𝑥2 
assumes its possible values (i.e., 21, 57, 76, 182 and 480 gpm/RCP) are defined by the different 
branches probabilities of the static ET (defined by the probabilistic model).  
The probabilities assigned for each possible value of the inputs x3 and x4 are listed in Table 8. 
 












Table 8: Probabilities arbitrarily assigned for x3 and x4 
 
Since each simulation, fed by a given input vector ?̅? =  {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4}, leads to a core uncovery at 
time 𝑦𝑡, we can define the probability to have core uncovery at time 𝑦𝑡 as the conditional probability 
that ?̅? assumes the corresponding input values (considering fixed both the value of x1 by the 
probabilistic model and of x2, as the different leakage rates have been considered separately). 
Correspondingly, for each scenario (and, thus, for each simulation), we can calculate the Core 
Damage Probability (PCD), defined, in general, as the probability of the occurrence of core uncovery 
at 𝑦𝑡, conditioned to the probability that the recovery of AC power (with the consequent restoration 
of safety systems to mitigate the consequences of the Seal LOCA) occurs at trec after the uncovery at 
yt and, thus, the AC power recovery does not contribute to preventing the core damage. We assume 
the recovery time trec to follow a lognormal distribution with a mean value of 10800 s. 
Tables 9 - 11 show the values of the PCD and the accident sequence risk (computed by multiplying by 
the leakage initiating event probabilities) for the different probabilistic models, WOG2000, 
WOG2000 (revised) with 𝑥1= 13 min, and the WOG2000 (revised) with 𝑥1= 0 min, respectively. 
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For each probabilistic model, the PCD for each leakage rate 𝑥2 is listed in the second column of the 
tables: this is defined as the sum of the PCD calculated with fixed 𝑥2 and 𝑥1 (that is fixed by the 
probabilistic model) and all the possible combinations PCD of 𝑥3 and 𝑥4. For instance, for the 
WOG2000 model (corresponding to 𝑥1 = 0 min), the PCD of 𝑥2 = 480 gpm/RCP has been computed 
as the sum of all the PCD computed for sequences of vectors ?̅? = {0 𝑚𝑖𝑛, 480
𝑔𝑝𝑚
𝑅𝐶𝑃
, 𝑥3, 𝑥4}, with 𝑥3 = 
20 min, 30 min, 40 min, 50 min, 60 min and 𝑥4 = “A”,”B”. It is worth mentioning that, even though 
no sequences were available for 21 gpm/RCP and 57 gpm/RCP we have assumed for the former 
negligible consequences, whereas for the latter the same core uncovery time of the case 𝑥2 = 76 
gpm/RCP, conservatively. The probability of occurrence of 𝑥2, listed in the third column (as 
presented in Figure 3 and Figure 4), is multiplied by the computed PCD to obtain the accident sequence 
probability related to each leakage rate listed in the fourth column. Finally, the total CD probability 
is the sum of the accident sequence probability related to all the leakage rates (i.e., 21, 57, 76, 182, 
480 gpm/RCP for the WOG2000 and 21, 76, 182, 480 gpm/RCP for the WOG2000 (revised)) as 










21 gpm/RCP 0 0.79 0 
1.35E-003 
57 gpm/RCP 0 0.1442 0 
76 gpm/RCP 0 0.01 0 
182 gpm/RCP 1.15E-004 0.0533 6.14E-006 
480 gpm/RCP 5.36E-001 0.025 1.34E-003 










21 gpm/RCP 0 0.79 0 
1.93E-003 
57 gpm/RCP - - - 
76 gpm/RCP 0 0.01 0 
182 gpm/RCP 2.65E-004 0.1975 5.23E-005 
480 gpm/RCP 7.15E-001 0.025 1.88E-003 













21 gpm/RCP 0 0.79 0 
4.26E-003 
57 gpm/RCP - - - 
76 gpm/RCP 1.37E-008 0.01 1.37E-010 
182 gpm/RCP 9.86E-003 0.1975 1.95E-003 
480 gpm/RCP 9.26E-001 0.025 2.31E-003 
Table 11: WOG2000 (revised) with 𝑥1 = 0 𝑚𝑖𝑛 
 
We can conclude that WOG2000 (revised) with 𝑥1= 0 min provides the largest estimation of the CD 
probability that is contributed mostly by 𝑥2= 480 gpm/RCP and 𝑥2= 182 gpm/RCP. For the other 
models, only 𝑥2 = 480 gpm/RCP really contributes to the CD probability , confirming the results of 
the DPSM-based sensitivity analysis of Section 3.1.3.2, that had identified 𝑥2 as the input variable 
that most affects the available grace time. Moreover, this probabilistic analysis also confirms that the 
worst case (i.e., the shortest grace time available for counteracting the developing accident ?̂?𝑡 = 7406 
s) corresponds to the scenario in which a leakage rate 𝑥2 = 480 gpm/RCP occurs at the beginning of 
the scenario (𝑥1 = 0 s) and operators act after twenty minutes (𝑥3 = 20 min) with strategy 𝑥4 = “A”. 
As a last remark, it is worth mentioning that an increase of 𝑥1 = 13 min of the time of the leakage rate 
increase for the WOG2000 (revised) implies the total CD probability  to be reduced of approximately 
55% with respect to the same probabilistic model but with 𝑥1= 0 min. Whereas, a further increase of 
the time of the leakage rate increase up to 𝑥1 = 30 min (WOG2000) implies a reduction of 
approximately 31% with respect to the WOG2000 (revised) model with 𝑥1 = 13 min. Therefore, the 
reduction is not significant for a relevant increase of 𝑥1, that, again, confirms the results of the DPSM-
based sensitivity analysis that ranks 𝑥1 lower than 𝑥2 with respect to its effects on the accident 
progression. 
 
3.2 U-Tube Steam Generator  
3.2.1 The system 
A schematic of a U–Tube Steam Generator (UTSG) of a NPP is shown in Figure 5. This system has 
been chosen because several studies have shown that its malfunction can be considered as one of the 





Figure 5: Schematic of the UTSG [IAEA-TECDOC-981, 1997] 
 
The reactor coolant enters the UTSG at the bottom, moves upward and then downward in the inverted 
U-tubes, transferring heat to the secondary fluid before exiting at the bottom. The secondary fluid, 
the feed water (𝑄𝑒), enters the UTSG at the top of the downcomer, through the space between the 
tube bundle wrapper and the SG shell. The value of 𝑄𝑒 is regulated by a system of valves: a low flow 
rate valve, used when the operating power (𝑃𝑜) is smaller than 15% of nominal power (𝑃𝑛), and a high 
flow rate valve when 𝑃𝑜 > 0.15 𝑃𝑛 [Aubry et al., 2012]. In the secondary side of the tube bundle, water 
heats up, reaches saturation, starts boiling and turns into a two-phase mixture. The two-phase fluid 
moves up through the separator/riser section, where steam is separated from liquid water, and through 
the dryers, which ensure that the exiting steam (𝑄𝑣) is essentially dry [Di Maio et al., 2014a]. The 
separated water is recirculated back to the downcomer. The balance between the exiting 𝑄𝑣 and the 
incoming 𝑄𝑒 governs the change in the water level in the SG. Because of the two-phase nature, two 
types of water level measurements are considered, as shown in Figure 5, each reflecting a different 
level concept: the Narrow Range Level (𝑁𝑟𝑙) is calculated by pressure difference between two points 
close to the water level and indicates the mixture level, whereas, the Wide Range Level (𝑊𝑟𝑙) is 
calculated by pressure difference between the two extremities of the SG (steam dome and bottom of 
the downcomer) and indicates the collapsed liquid level that is related with the mass of water in the 
SG [Di Maio et al., 2014a]. 
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The goal of the system is to maintain the 𝑁𝑟𝑙 (𝑦) at a reference position 𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑓 = 151.67 cm. The SG 
fails if 𝑦 rises (falls) above (below) the threshold 𝑈 = 177.417 cm (𝐿 = 106.2 cm), that triggers an 
automatic turbine trip. Indeed, if the 𝑦 exceeds 𝑈, the steam separator and dryer lose their 
functionality and excessive moisture is carried in 𝑄𝑣, degrading the turbine blades profile and the 
turbine efficiency; if 𝑦 decreases below 𝐿, insufficient cooling capability of the primary fluid occurs. 
Similarly, the 𝑊𝑟𝑙 is relevant for the cooling capability of the primary circuit [Kothare et al., 2000].  
A dedicated model of the system has been implemented in SIMULINK to simulate the dynamic 
response of the UTSG at different 𝑃𝑜 values [Di Maio et al., 2014a]. In this model, both feedforward 
and feedback digital control schemes have been adopted. The feedback controller is a PID that 
provides a flow rate 𝑄𝑝𝑖𝑑 resulting from the residuals between 𝑦 and 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑓, whereas the feedforward 
controller operates a safety relief valve that is opened if and only if 𝑦 exceeds the 𝑁ℎ𝑙 (which is an 
upper pre-alarm), and removes a constant flow rate (𝑄𝑠𝑓).   
Multiple component failures considered can occur during system operation continuously at random 
time between [0, 4000] (s). This mission time (𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠 = 4000 𝑠) has been chosen in order to account 
for the complete development also of slow dynamic accident scenarios [Di Maio et al., 2014a]. 
Components can fail according to different magnitudes of the failure. In particular: 
1. The outlet steam valve can fail in three different positions: i) closed; ii) stuck open at 50% of 
the nominal 𝑄𝑣 that should be provided at 𝑃𝑜; iii) stuck open at 150% of the nominal 𝑄𝑣 that 
should be provided at 𝑃𝑜. 
2. The communication between the sensor that monitors 𝑦 and the PID controller can fail, 
returning the same input value of the previous time step. 
3. The safety relief valve can fail at a uniform random value 𝑄𝑠𝑓  in the range [0.5, 50.5] (kg/s). 
4. The PID controller can fail providing a uniform random flow rate 𝑄𝑝𝑖𝑑 belonging to [-18, 18] 
% of the nominal 𝑄𝑒 that should be provided at 𝑃𝑜.  
Although in a real accident progression, timing, order and magnitude of failure events should assume 
continuous values, this would make the problem intractable within a classical PSA framework. To 
deal with this (and at the same time leveraging the computational demand) we have approximated the 
problem with discretized timing and magnitude values of the failure events in order to generate the 
dynamic scenarios. In particular, a Multiple Value Logic (MVL) for an approximated description of 
the continuous time of occurrence of component failures and their magnitudes has been adopted [Di 
Maio et al., 2014a].  The MVL allows describing a situation in which the components can fail at any 
(discrete) time along the scenario (𝑥1,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝, referring to a generic component comp) with different 
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(discrete) magnitudes (𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝) [Di Maio et al., 2014a]. In the MVL vector, an additional variable 
(𝑥3,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝) indicates the order of occurrence of the different failure events in the sequence. 
The discretization of the time and magnitudes values is as follows: 
 time discretization: we refer to 𝑥1,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 1, 𝑥1,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 2, 𝑥1,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 3 and 𝑥1,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 4, for 
failures occurring in the intervals [0, 1000] (s), [1001, 2000] (s), [2001, 3000] (s), [3001, 
4000] (s), respectively; if the label 𝑥1,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 0, the component does not fail within the time 
of the whole scenario, 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠.  
 Magnitude discretization: 
 the steam valve magnitude (𝑥2,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚) is indicated as 1, 2 or 3 for failure states 
corresponding to stuck at 0%, stuck at 50% and stuck at 150% of the 𝑄𝑒 value that 
should be provided at 𝑃𝑜, respectively; if 𝑥2,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 = 0, the component does not fail in 
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠;  
 the communication between the sensor measuring 𝑦 and the PID controller 𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚 =
0 if the communication works, 𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚 = 1 otherwise; 
 the safety relief valve fails with magnitude 𝑥2,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 that can assume the values 1, 2, 
3 and 4, if it is stuck between [0.5, 12.6] (kg/s), (12.6, 25.27] (kg/s), (25.27, 37.91] 
(kg/s) and (37.91, 50.5] (kg/s), respectively; 𝑥2,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 = 0, indicates that the 
component does not fail in 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠; 
 the PID controller failure magnitude range is discretized into 8 equally spaced 
magnitude intervals, 𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷 labeled from 1 to 8, representative of failure states 
corresponding to discrete intervals of output value belonging to [-18,18]% of the 𝑄𝑒 
value that should be provided at 𝑃𝑜; if 𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷 = 0, the component does not fail in 
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠. 
The possible failure events combinations give rise to 100509 possible sequences, each described by 
a MVL vector. Among these sequences, in order to reproduce the same conditions of the previous 
case study for the comparison of the results, an arbitrary number N = 90 of simulations have been 
randomly selected to challenge the DPSM sensitivity analysis method presented in Section 2 (i.e., we 
assume independent inputs and, therefore, as in Section 3.1.2, no joint distributions). For each 
dynamic simulation, the value y of the level that is reached along the scenario progression and the 
corresponding grace time 𝑦𝑡 have been collected, ?̅? and ?̅?𝑡 respectively. In particular, when 𝑦 =  𝑈 
= 177.417 cm is reached (and, thus, the corresponding safety margin is 0), we record the grace time 
yt for reaching the threshold; otherwise, for the scenarios in which 𝑦 <  𝑈, during the entire 
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accidental progression, the maximum value reached by 𝑦 and the corresponding grace time 𝑦𝑡 at 
which it is reached are recorded. 
 
3.2.2 DPSMs and Sensitivity Analysis results 
 3.2.2.1 The DPSMs 
The collected values of ?̅? and ?̅?𝑡 (i.e., the Narrow Range Level Nrl and the corresponding time, 
respectively) have been employed for the calculation of the DPSMs (see Section 2.2). Since the alarm 
triggers either when Nrl falls below the lower threshold 𝐿 or rises above the upper threshold U, we 
focus, without loss of generality, on the upper threshold 𝑈. Resorting to OS, we have estimated the 
values of the 𝛾1
𝑡ℎ and 𝛾2
𝑡ℎpercentiles, with confidences 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, of the Narrow Range Level y and 
of the time at which this level is reached. This has been determined using all the 𝑁 = 90 simulations, 
as well as all the subgroups, that is, considering the simulations when each input variable is kept 
fixed, and components are analyzed independently. 
In Tables 12 and 13, we report ?̂?𝛾1, the value of ?̂?𝑡 and the values of the DPSM for two different cases 
(𝛾2 and 𝛽2 is fixed, respectively), when all the N = 90 simulations results are considered.  
Results of the computation of DPSM for the case in which all the 𝑁 = 90 available simulations are 
used simultaneously is shown in Tables 12 and 13. The estimation of the value of the Narrow Range 
Level ?̂? results equal to U. The DPSM of Eq. (3) provides the additional information of the grace 
time ?̂?𝑡 = 213 s (to reach the alarm triggering). 
DPSM provides the analyst with the additional information of the grace time ?̂?𝑡 (before the alarm 
triggering), which is a main benefit of the DPSM with respect to the traditional safety margin. This 
means that, when ?̂?𝛾1is equal to U, the value of the grace time ?̂?𝑡 is the time available for taking 
counteracting/mitigation actions before alarm triggering. It is worth mentioning that, even though the 
regulation guidances prescribe the DPSM to be given with 𝛾1 = 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 0.95 and 𝛾2 = 0.05, the 
limited number N of available simulations: 
- limits the analysis on the estimation of the grace time available before core uncover with the 
desired 𝛾2 and 𝛽2; 
- is not large enough to allow for an estimate of ?̂?𝑡 with 𝛾2 = 0.05 and 𝛽2= 0.95). 
Therefore, in Table 12, we provide the results when we aim at estimating exactly the 𝛾2
𝑡ℎ percentile 
of yt, with the as large as possible 𝛽2 according to the two different approaches (“Bracketing” and 
“Coverage” as explained in Appendix A). On the contrary, in Table 13, we provide the result when 
the confidence in the estimation, i.e., 𝛽2, is fixed to at least equal to 0.95 whereas the value of the 





𝜸𝟐 𝜷𝟐 “Bracketing” 𝜷𝟐 “Coverage” ?̂?𝜸𝟏[𝒄𝒎] ?̂?𝒕 [s] DPSM 
0.05 0.98 0.94 177.417 = U 213 
0 within a grace time 
of 213 s 
Table 12: DPSM (N=90 and with fixed γ2) for the UTSG 
 
𝜷𝟐 𝜸𝟐 “Bracketing”  𝜸𝟐 “Coverage” ?̂?𝜸𝟏[𝒄𝒎] ?̂?𝒕 [s] DPSM 
0.95 0.04 0.03 177.417 = U 213 
0 within a grace time 
of 213 s 
Table 13: DPSM (N=90 and with fixed β2) for the UTSG 
 
Results of the computation of DPSM for the case of subgroups are shown hereafter. It is worth 
mentioning that: (i) being the computed ?̂?𝛾1 equal to U (as shown before in Tables 12 and 13); (ii) 
being the number 𝑁 of available simulations lower than 90 for each considered subgroup, and each 
component separately, we focus only on the estimation of the value ?̂?𝑡 that, incidentally, cannot be 
estimated with both 𝛽2 and 𝛾2 with the values, as required by regulation guidances. The reduced 
number N of simulations results is due to the fact that, when we consider a variable to be kept fixed 
at a given value of its possible instances, the number of available simulations reduces to only those 
that have as inputs the selected fixed value of that input variable and the combination of all the other 
possible values of the other input variables. 
Results of the computation of DPSM for the case of subgroups (and focusing on the single 
component) are shown hereafter. Tables 14-17 show the DPSM quantification when the steam valve, 
the communication, the safety valve and the PID fail independently, respectively. 
In particular, in Table 14, the results of the estimated grace time ?̂?𝑡, when the steam valve fails, are 
shown, when a different number N of simulations are available due to the input 𝑥1,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚, 𝑥2,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚, 
𝑥3,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 being kept fixed at given values. As already said, both the case when 𝛾2 is fixed and 𝛽2 is 
fixed are presented.  
Similarly to the first case study, we find that: 
 the “Bracketing” approach generally provides a larger confidence 𝛽2 for the estimate of the 
𝛾2
𝑡ℎ percentile of 𝑦𝑡 than the “Coverage” approach. Contrarily, when 𝛽2 is fixed, the 
“Bracketing” approach provides unfavorable estimated value of the 𝛾2
𝑡ℎ percentile with fixed 
𝛽2 with respect to the “Coverage” approach. 
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  When we consider results obtained with fixed values of the inputs, the value of the percentile 
that can be estimated unfavorably increases, being the number 𝑁 of available simulations 
lower than when all simulations are simultaneously considered; the values of 𝛾2, indeed,  go 
from 0.04 and 0.03 (“Bracketing” and “Coverage”, respectively), to 0.28 and 0.25 (when 
𝑥1,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 = 4 is kept fixed and 𝑁 = 11). Similarly, we can see that the confidence 𝛽2 
unfavourably decreases, when the value of 𝛾2 is fixed to 0.05.The values of 𝛽2, indeed,  go 
from 0.98 and 0.94 (“Bracketing” and “Coverage”, respectively) for the best case with 𝑁 = 
90, to 0.19 and 0.11 (when 𝑥1,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 = 4 is kept fixed and 𝑁 = 11); 
 The worst case (i.e., the shortest grace time available for counteracting the developing 
accident  ?̂?𝑡 = 213 s) corresponds to the scenario in which the failure of the steam valve occurs 
at time 𝑥1,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 = 1, with magnitude 𝑥2,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 = 2 when the failure is the second event of the 










𝜸𝟐   
“Coverage” ?̂?t 
 
𝜸𝟐  = 0.05 𝜷𝟐  = 0.95 
All 
simulations 












1 17 0.34 0.22 0.19 0.17 213 
2 26 0.54 0.38 0.13 0.11 544 
3 24 0.5 0.35 0.14 0.12 266 





0 12 0.21 0.13 0.26 0.23 312 
1 19 0.39 0.25 0.18 0.15 318 
2 32 0.65 0.49 0.11 0.09 213 




1 19 0.39 0.25 0.18 0.15 253 
2 29 0.6 0.44 0.12 0.1 213 
3 18 0.36 0.24 0.18 0.16 307 
4 12 0.21 0.13 0.26 0.23 266 




In Table 15, the results of the estimated grace time ?̂?𝑡 when the communication between the sensor 
and the PID fails, are shown, for a different number N of simulations with the input 𝑥1,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚, 𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚, 
𝑥3,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚 kept fixed at given values. As already said, both the case when 𝛾2 is fixed and  𝛽2 is fixed 














𝜸𝟐  = 0.05 𝜷𝟐  = 0.95 
All 
simulations 











1 21 0.43 0.29 0.16 0.14 213 
2 18 0.36 0.24 0.18 0.16 318 
3 18 0.36 0.24 0.18 0.16 307 





0 13 0.24 0.14 0.25 0.22 213 




1 19 0.39 0.25 0.18 0.15 544 
2 26 0.54 0.38 0.13 0.12 266 
3 19 0.39 0.25 0.18 0.15 213 
4 13 0.24 0.14 0.25 0.22 307 
Table 15: DPSM for the communication between the sensor and the PID controller 
 
In Table 16, the results of the estimated grace time ?̂?𝑡 when the safety valve fails, are shown, for a 
different number N of simulations, with the input 𝑥1,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦, 𝑥2,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦, 𝑥3,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 kept fixed at given 
values. As already said, both the case when 𝛾2 is fixed and 𝛽2 is fixed are presented. Also in this case, 
















𝜸𝟐  = 0.05 𝜷𝟐  = 0.95 
All 
simulations 











1 18 0.36 0.24 0.18 0.16 213 
2 27 0.56 0.40 0.13 0.11 253 
3 19 0.39 0.25 0.18 0.15 312 





0 3 0.02 0.01 0.71 0.67 9000 
1 13 0.24 0.14 0.25 0.22 1253 
2 23 0.48 0.33 0.15 0.13 213 
3 28 0.58 0.42 0.12 0.11 312 




1 25 0.52 0.37 0.14 0.12 1221 
2 17 0.34 0.22 0.20 0.17 307 
3 29 0.6 0.44 0.12 0.1 213 
4 16 0.31 0.2 0.11 0.18 213 
Table 16: DPSM for the safety valve 
 
In Table 17, the results of the estimated grace time ?̂?𝑡, when the PID controller fails, are shown, for 
a different number N of simulations, with the input 𝑥1,𝑃𝐼𝐷, 𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷, 𝑥3,𝑃𝐼𝐷 kept fixed at given values. 
As already said, both the case when 𝛾2 is fixed and secondly, the 𝛽2 is fixed are presented. Results 

















𝜸𝟐  = 0.05 𝜷𝟐  = 0.95 
All 
simulations 











1 18 0.36 0.24 0.19 0.16 213 
2 27 0.56 0.4 0.13 0.11 544 
3 19 0.39 0.25 0.18 0.15 503 





0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 10 0.16 0.09 0.31 0.28 544 
2 10 0.16 0.09 0.31 0.28 213 
3 12 0.21 0.13 0.26 0.23 307 
4 19 0.39 0.25 0.18 0.15 266 
5 10 0.16 0.09 0.31 0.28 253 
6 9 0.14 0.08 0.34 0.3 1503 
7 15 0.29 0.18 0.22 0.19 1253 




1 21 0.43 0.29 0.16 0.14 213 
2 23 0.48 0.33 0.15 0.13 253 
3 14 0.26 0.16 0.23 0.2 503 
4 32 0.65 0.49 0.11 0.09 1253 
Table 17: DPSM for the PID 
 
3.2.2.2 Sensitivity analysis 
On the basis of the results shown from Table 14 to Table 17, the proposed sensitivity index of Eq. 
(10) has been computed for each input variable 𝑥𝑘, k = 1, 2, 3 (see Section 2.2), considering the 
components independently. Results, referred to each component, are shown in Tables 18-21, where 
in column 2 the possible values 𝑥𝑘,𝑖 of 𝑥𝑘 are listed, in column 3 the estimated values of the grace 
time ?̂?𝑡 are listed, in columns 4 and 5 the variability range of the normalized input ∆𝑥𝑘 (as explained 
in Section 2.2) and the  variability range ∆?̂?𝑡 of the normalized ?̂?𝑡, are listed respectively, when only 
the simulations when each input variable is kept fixed are considered. Finally, in the last column, the 
value of the sensitivity index 𝐼𝑥𝑘 computed for each input variable is shown. 
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In Table 18, the results of the sensitivity analysis referred to the failure events of the steam valve are 
presented. The steam valve failure time 𝑥1,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 is the input that most affects the grace time ?̂?𝑡 
available, whereas the failure magnitude 𝑥2,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 and the order of the failure 𝑥3,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 along the 
accidental sequence of events have almost the same (low) influence on the output ?̂?𝑡. 
 
𝒙𝒌 𝒙𝒌,𝒊 ?̂?𝒕 ∆𝒙𝒌 ∆?̂?𝒕 𝑰𝒙𝒌 
𝒙𝟏,𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒂𝒎 
1 213 














Table 18: Sensitivity analysis for the steam valve 
 
In Table 19, the results of the sensitivity analysis referred to the failure of the communication between 
the sensor and the PID controller are shown.  
The failure magnitude 𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚 appears to be irrelevant for the ?̂?𝑡, (∆?̂?𝑡 = 0), in both cases of 
communication working (𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚= 0) or failed (𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚= 1). However, the order 𝑥3,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚 at which 





𝒙𝒌 𝒙𝒌,𝒊 ?̂?𝒕 ∆𝒙𝒌 ∆?̂?𝒕 𝑰𝒙𝒌 
𝒙𝟏,𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎 
1 213 














Table 19: Sensitivity analysis for the communication between the sensor and the PID controller 
 
The results of sensitivity analysis referred to the safety valve failure are shown in Table 20. The 
failure magnitude 𝑥2,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 and the failure order along the accidental sequence 𝑥3,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 have a large 
influence on ?̂?𝑡, whereas the failure time 𝑥1,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 has smaller influence on ?̂?𝑡.  
 
𝒙𝒌 𝒙𝒌,𝒊 ?̂?𝒕 ∆𝒙𝒌 ∆?̂?𝒕 𝑰𝒙𝒌 
𝒙𝟏,𝒔𝒂𝒇𝒆𝒕𝒚 
1 213 
















Table 20: Sensitivity analysis for the safety valve 
 
The results for the failure of the PID are shown in Table 21. Although the failure magnitude 𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷 is 
relevant for the quantification of ?̂?𝑡, the failure time 𝑥1,𝑃𝐼𝐷 and the failure order along the accidental 




𝒙𝒌 𝒙𝒌,𝒊 ?̂?𝒕 ∆𝒙𝒌 ∆?̂?𝒕 𝑰𝒙𝒌 
𝒙𝟏,𝑷𝑰𝑫 
1 213 




















Table 21: Sensitivity analysis for the PID 
 
In conclusion, we can claim that dynamic aspects are critical for the estimation of ?̂?𝑡 for the UTSG 
system: sensitivity analysis results, indeed, show that, among the different inputs considered (𝑥1,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝, 
𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝, 𝑥3,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝), the failure time 𝑥1,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 affects the quantification of ?̂?𝑡 when the failure of the 
steam valve is considered, the failure magnitude 𝑥2,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 and the failure order 𝑥3,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦, affects ?̂?𝑡 
when the failure of the safety valve is considered, the failure time 𝑥1,𝑃𝐼𝐷 and the failure order 𝑥3,𝑃𝐼𝐷 
affects ?̂?𝑡 when the failure of the PID is considered and finally, the failure order 𝑥3,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚 influences 
?̂?𝑡 when the failure of the communication between the sensor and the PID controller is taken into 
account. Although a comprehensive analysis should consider all the number of possible sequences of 
events originated by the MVL approximation of Section 3.2.1, the results here provided based on 
only 𝑁 = 90 randomly selected sequences of events are sufficient to conclude that a DET analysis is 
needed rather than a static ET analysis. In next Section, we will briefly show the advantages of a 
DET, that accounts for the different times, magnitude and order of failure events, with respect to a 




3.2.3 The Dynamic Event Tree 
In this Section, supported by the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis of Section 3.2.2.2, a DET 
methodology is used to account for the system dynamics along the accidental sequences progression 
(considering the timing 𝑥1,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝, the magnitude 𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 and the order 𝑥3,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝 of failure events for the 
different components) and to compute the probability of occurrence of the accidental scenarios. 
A DET is in principle similar to a static ET (where the sequence of system responses following an 
initiating event is predetermined by the analyst) except that, in a DET, both the timing and sequence 
of system responses are determined by a time-dependent model of system evolution, and only the 
branching rules are determined by the analyst [Aldemir, 2013]. The time-dependent model of the 
systems allows for a MVL description of components states which, therefore, accounts for different 
timing, order and magnitude of the possible failure events, leading, consequently, to a multitude of 
possible scenarios much larger than for a static ET analysis.  
Among the scenarios, the identification of Prime Implicants (PIs) is fundamental for the calculation 
of the probability of failure of the system and for the analysis of such a system. PIs correspond, 
indeed, to the Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) of the static ET, but are also supplied with the information of 
time, sequence and magnitude of failures occurrences.  [Quine, 1952; Di Maio et al., 2014b; Di Maio 
et al., 2015b]. Moreover, PIs identification allows for a more accurate characterization of failure 
sequences of non–coherent systems, that are those systems where both the failed or the working states 
of a component can lead to the system failure [Di Maio et al., 2014a], as it is for the UTSG hereafter 
analyzed. 
Another important category of sequences arises when dynamics is considered in the analysis that are 
the so called Near Misses, which are sequences (among safe scenarios), whose sequences of events 
lead the safety parameter values close to, but not exceeding, the corresponding acceptable thresholds 
[Zio et al., 2009]. For the UTSG, we rely on the classification of the sequences in Safe, Near Misses 
and PIs as presented in [Di Maio et al., 2014a]. 
In what follows, we compare the advantages of a DET with respect to a static ET by assuming a 
failure probability equal to 10-3 for the PID (Pfail,PID) and for the communication between the sensor 
and the PID failure (Pfail,comm), 10
-2 for the steam valve (Pfail,steam) and 10
-4 for the safety valve 
(Pfail,safety). Figure 6 shows a static ET for the scenario events related to safety valve, communication, 
PID and steam valve. The probability of each branch of the ET is given in Figure 6. Dashed branches 
are the MCS for this scenario as identified in [Di Maio et al., 2014a], whose total probability of 





Figure 6: Event Tree  
 
However, it is important to notice that the results of the static ET might be invalidated when a different 
combination of failures times, order, and magnitudes occur. As we will show, indeed, a single branch 
(scenario) of the static ET corresponds effectively to more different branches in the DET, which are 
all the possible combinations of timing, order and magnitude of the components that fail during the 
considered static scenario. Consequently, a branch of static ET lumps together safe, near miss and PI 
scenarios, that would be otherwise spooned out if the system dynamics was modelled within a DET. 
To show this, without loss of generality, we focus on a selection of MVL sequences of the UTSG 
that, incidentally, are three safe sequences, four NMs and four PIs, among the 100509 possible 
sequences. Table 22 lists the selected sequences (defined in terms of order and discrete magnitude 
and timing of failure events of each component). 
For each dynamic sequence, times of failures and magnitudes have been sampled from the 
corresponding intervals that have been introduced in Section 3.2.1 (e.g., if the time of failure is labeled 
as 1, it is sampled from the interval [1, 1000]; similarly, for magnitudes), and the SIMULINK model 
has been run. 
Figure 9 plots the dynamic sequences listed in Table 22 as branches of a DET (where dashed branches 
are left unsolved and only the failure magnitudes m generate alternative paths, whereas the effects of 
timing and order are not shown, for the sake of the Figure clarity and to avoid the combinatorial 
explosion of the number of branches to be plotted). Figure 22 reports, for each sequence, the values 
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of the probability of the corresponding branch calculated in the static ET of Figure 8. It is important 
to mention that, for the DET, we have considered the PID failure probability Pfail,PID equal to 1.25E-
04 (i.e, 1/8 of the Pfail,PID in the static ET), the safety valve failure probability Pfail,SV  equal to 2.5E-
05 (i.e, 1/4 of the Pfail,SV in the static ET), the steam valve failure probability Pfail,ST.V equal to 3.33E-
03 (i.e., 1/3 of the Pfail,ST.V), and Pfail,COMM has been assumed equal to 10
-2, being only one the possible 
magnitude of the communication. 
 
Table 22: The MVL dynamic sequences considered for the DET  
 
In Figure 9, the evidence of the effects of timing and failure order on the accidental scenarios 
consequences is shown. For example, let us consider the sequence with safety valve failure magnitude 
equal to 3, failure magnitude of the communication equal to 1, steam valve not failed (failure 
magnitude equal to 0) and, finally, failure magnitude of the PID controller equal to 3. These events 
are resumed into the second and the tenth sequence of Table 22, that means that the originated DET 
branch correspond to two different sequences differing only for timing and order of failure events 
(and, thus, not shown) but leading to two opposite consequences, i.e., in one case safe and in the other 
PI. 
Moreover, results of Figure 9 show that each failure sequence evolves with a larger probability in the 
ET, than in the DET. However, further efforts should be devoted to investigate whether a static ET 
branch envelopes (or not) all the possible dynamic sequences that would be generated by a DET. It 
may happen, in fact, that, when considering all the dynamic sequences (lumped in the same branch 
in an ET) the ET may not necessarily overestimate, but it may even underestimate the failure 
probability (if the system modelled in not-coherent, for which both failed and working states of the 
same components can lead the system to failure [Di Maio et al., 2015a]). 
 Safety valve Communication PID Steam valve 
Sequence Time Mag Order Time Mag Order Time Mag Order Time Mag Order 
SAFE 0 0 0 4 1 2 4 8 1 0 0 0 
SAFE 1 3 2 1 1 1 4 3 3 0 0 0 
SAFE 4 3 4 2 1 3 2 5 1 2 2 2 
NM 3 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 0 0 0 
NM 4 4 3 4 1 2 1 4 1 0 0 0 
NM 4 3 4 4 1 3 1 4 1 2 1 2 
NM 4 2 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 0 0 0 
PI 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 4 2 0 0 0 
PI 1 4 1 3 1 3 1 2 2 0 0 0 
PI 2 3 1 4 1 2 4 3 3 0 0 0 























Fig. 9: Comparison of ET and DET results for the dynamic sequences of Table 22 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this work, a sensitivity analysis method has been presented, to determine which input variables of 
a TH codes affect most the safety margin quantification of a dynamic system. Safety margin has been 
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𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 5 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 6 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 7 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 8 
No failure 
No failure 𝑥2,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚  = 1 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 1 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 8 
No failure 𝑥2,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚  = 3 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 1 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 8 
No failure 𝑥2,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚  = 2 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 1 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 8 
No failure 
𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚  =  1 No failure 
No failure 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 8 
SAFE 9.90E-07 1.24E-07 0.00E+00 
 
PI 9.89E-07 3.09E-09 2.75E-09 
 
No failure No failure 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 4 
𝑥2,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦  = 1 
No failure 
𝑥2,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦  = 2 
𝑥2,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦  = 3 
𝑥2,𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦  = 4 
𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚  =  1 
𝑥2,𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚  =  1 




𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 4 
NM 9.90E-11 3.09E-012 5.57E-13 
 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 4 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 4 
𝑥2,𝑃𝐼𝐷  = 2 
𝑥2,𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚  = 3 
PI 9.90E-11 3.09E-12 1.98E-12 
NM 9.90E-11 3.09E-12 0.00E+00 
    
PI 1.00E-12 1.04E-14 1.04E-14 
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SAFE 9.90E-11 3.09E-12 0.00E+00 
PI 9.90E-11 3.09E-12 1.36E-12 
NM 9.90E-11 3.09E-12 0.00E+00 
NM 1.00E-12 1.04E-14 0.00E+00 
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computed according to a dynamic probabilistic definition, which allows for the quantification of the 
uncertainties affecting the safety parameter evolution along an accidental scenario and, at the same 
time, accounts also for the earliest time needed to reach the estimated safety margin. Based on the 
results of this analysis, it is possible to conclude whether dynamic aspects influence (or not) the safety 
margin quantification. This can be used to decide the most correct probabilistic model to be used for 
the system safety assessment and the computation of the probability of occurrence of the accidental 
scenarios considered: a static analysis (i.e., a static ET) or a dynamic analysis (i.e., a DET). The 
method has been applied to two different cases of study: an SBO followed by a Seal LOCA and the 
UTSG in which four components are supposed to fail. Concerning the first case of study, the 
sensitivity analysis allows us to conclude that simulated boiled up water level in the core whose 
dynamic evolution with MAAP5 TH code is not sensitive to the dynamic inputs (i.e., time of operators 
actions, time of the onset of the increased leakage rate). Therefore, a static analysis has been 
performed to evaluate the probabilities of core damage based only on the failure probabilities of static 
events (i.e., seal stages). On the contrary, in the second case of study, dynamic inputs of the 
SIMULINK model of the UTSG (i.e., time, magnitude and order of the steam valve, the 
communication, the safety valve and the PID) result to be relevant for the variability of the water 
narrow range level fluctuation during the accidental scenarios considered. Consequently, a simplified 
DET has been built and a comparison between the results of a static ET and the DET have been 
presented. The comparison has shown, in particular, that a single branch of the static ET corresponds 
to many branches of the DET and that, consequently, a static scenario of the ET can correspond, in 
reality, simultaneously to safe scenario, a NM, or a PI, in the DET, that would lead to a wrong 
quantification of the system failure if dynamic aspects are neglected.  
From the applications to the two cases of study, some limits for the proposed method arise: 
1. The estimation of the values of 𝑦𝛾1 and 𝑦𝑡𝛾2  through OS suffers the limited number of 
available TH code simulations, when the analyst is required to ensure both the value of the 
percentile and of the confidence on its estimate. One possible solution can consist in utilizing 
other methods, such as Finite Mixture Models [McLachlan et al. 2000] that have been proven 
in [Di Maio et al., 2015a] to require a lower number of simulations than OS while, at the same 
time, to allow for estimating the entire distribution of the parameter rather than only few given 
percentiles, as it is for OS.  
2. The sensitivity index Ix, here defined gives an indication of which is the input that most affects 
the DPSM. However, it does not consider any non-linear system response to the accidental 
progressions that are simulated and, therefore, further efforts should be devoted to fill this 
gap, in future research works. 
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Therefore, we can conclude that further studies are necessary in order to overcome these limits and 
improve, consequently, the methodology presented for the selection of the probabilistic model to be 
used for the safety assessment of a NPP. 
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The real values of 𝑦𝛾1and 𝑦𝑡𝛾2  are unknown, because the distributions of y and yt are also unknown. 
Order Statistics (OS) is a non parametric model used to determine ?̂?𝛾1 and ?̂?𝑡𝛾2 , which are the 
estimation of 𝑦𝛾1and 𝑦𝑡𝛾2 , with a confidence β1 and β2, respectively [Nutt et al., 2004]. A limited 
number N TH simulations is available, where ?̅? = {𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑁} is the vector of the output safety 
variable and 𝑦?̅? = {𝑦𝑡1 , … , 𝑦𝑡𝑁} is the vector containing the time to reach the corresponding output 
values of ?̅?. OS ensures that the mth value (usually the first) of the N sorted output has a certain 
probability β of exceeding (undershooting) the unknown true value of the γth percentile of its 
distribution. This is valid for both y and yt [Di Maio et al., 2016]. 
Two different approaches, namely “Bracketing” and “Coverage”, are possible, depending on the 
assumptions done on the relationship between γ, β and N.  “Bracketing” approach [Nutt et al., 2004], 
with Assuming m = 1 and referring to uncorrelated outputs y and yt, defines: 
𝛽 = (1 − 𝛾𝑁)2 (A1) 
And, thus, ensures 𝛾1 to be the probability that 𝑦 lies below 𝑦𝛾1 in any of the 𝑁 runs, whatever the 
value of 𝑦𝑡, and 𝛾2 to be the corresponding probability for 𝑦𝑡 [Di Maio et al., 2016]. 
“Coverage” approach, with uncorrelated output y and yt, defines [Nutt et al., 2004]: 
𝛽 = 1 − 𝛾𝑁 + 𝑁𝛾𝑁 ln(𝛾) (A2) 
Usually, Eqs. (A1) and (A2) are used to get the optimal number N of simulations needed to estimate 
the γ=0.95 percentile with a confidence β = 0.95, as required by the regulation guidance: with this 
settings two approaches give N= 72 for “Bracketing” and N = 89 for “Coverage”. As we can notice, 
“Coverage” approach requires a larger number of runs as compared to the “Bracketing” approach. 
This is because in the “Coverage” approach (contrarily to the “Bracketing” approach) one output 
(e.g., 𝑦) is sorted jointly with the other output (e.g., 𝑦𝑡) and both percentiles 𝑦𝛾1 and 𝑦𝑡𝛾2  are required 
to simultaneously lie within the estimated percentiles ?̂?𝛾1 and ?̂?𝑡𝛾2  to guarantee the confidence 𝛽1 and 
𝛽2 [Di Maio et al., 2016]. 
 
